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Abstract 
This paper conducts the first general equilibrium analysis of the role of entry, exit and profits in industry 
dynamics.  The benefit of our model is twofold.  First, to discriminate between entrants’ role of 
performing the entrepreneurial function of creating disequilibrium and the conventional equilibrating role 
of moving the industry to a new equilibrium.  Second, to discriminate between three aspects of industry 
dynamics: the effect of entry and exit on market equilibrium, duration of disequilibrium and patterns of 
adjustment.  Using a rich data set of the retail industry, we construct a dynamic simultaneous equilibrium 
model of profits, entry and exit.  We find that indeed entrants play an entrepreneurial function causing 
long periods of disequilibrium after which a new equilibrium is attained.  Moreover, we find ample 
support for the statement that disequilibrium is the essence of economic progress. 
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1. Introduction 
While Schumpeter’s driver of economic progress is about how entrepreneurs generate shocks 
which disrupt existing market equilibrium, that of Schultz is about how entrepreneurs adjust to 
these shocks.  Schumpeter (1947) simply assumes that equilibrium is quickly restored after 
disruption.  For Schultz (1975) disequilibria are inevitable features of economic progress.1  It 
takes time to regain equilibrium and the adjustment patterns may vary according to the 
opportunities and restrictions of entrepreneurial behavior.  
 
In the classical framework entry and exit of firms rather than the entrepreneurial behavior of 
people play the role of adjustment mechanisms which restore market equilibrium.  Net-entry 
rises when incumbents’ profits are supernormal and falls when they are at unsustainable low 
levels.  The only economic function of entry and exit is to be reactive and respond to 
disequilibrium profit levels.  In equilibrium when profits are at normal levels, entry and exit 
have no role and are assumed to be in a steady state where entry equals exit.  These predictions 
are at odds with real life observations.  As is shown in Table 1 of the next section, entry and exit 
rates are not equal to zero, and their long-run averages are often also not equal to each other.  
Implicit in the analysis is that adjustment is frictionless and hence forsaking the importance of 
the duration of the disequilibrium stage and the patterns of adjustment in disequilibrium.  It is an 
adjustment process driven by firms having full and perfect information rather than by people 
having imperfect information and who are in need of learning.  The present paper is about all 
three phenomena which Schumpeter and Schultz identify as the essence of economic progress: 
the effect of entry and exit on market equilibrium, duration of disequilibrium and patterns of 
adjustment.  
 
Baumol (2002) points out that one of the most disappointing shortcomings in the classical 
approach is that it does not explain the enduring success of capitalism in generating economic 
growth.  This might have to do with the invisibility of the role of the entrepreneur (Barreto, 
1989).  As Schumpeter (1947) argues, classical analysis is preoccupied with competition 
without innovation and by consequence is focused on the sub plot of adjustment around any 
given equilibrium.  It does not enlighten our understanding of the main mystery which surrounds 
the determinants of the long-term dynamic equilibrium itself.  Moving the focus of attention to 
this question involves the role of innovation and differentiation.  It moves the attention from the 
price competition with fixed technology which is central in the classical framework towards 
competition involving new goods and services or new technology and organization.  In doing so 
it also introduces the potential for an entrepreneurial function for entrants, i.e., to discover, 
experiment, refine and exploit this potential.  No longer are entrants imitative ‘me too’ aspiring 
firms that seize their moment only when incumbents’ profits have become excessive.  Instead, 
entrants bring innovation and differentiation to the market and in the process introduce new 
profit opportunities.  In this framework they reverse the classical causation so that equilibrium 
normal profit levels are determined by entry and exit rather than the other way around.  In terms 
of entrepreneurial roles: it is the combination of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur creating 
instability and destruction and the more conventional Austrian entrepreneur combining 
resources to recreate stability (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999).  The Schumpeterian entrepreneur 
                                        
1 See also http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1979/schultz-lecture.html: “The transformation of 
agriculture into an increasingly more productive state, a process that is commonly referred to as "modernization", 
entails all manner of adjustments in farming as better opportunities become available. I have shown that the value 
of the ability to deal with disequilibria is high in a dynamic economy (Schultz, 1975). Such disequilibria are 
inevitable. They cannot be eliminated by law, by public policy, and surely not by rhetoric. Governments cannot 
perform efficiently the function of farm entrepreneurs.” 
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creates potential and the Austrian entrepreneur realizes it (Nooteboom, 2000).  This realization 
hinges around the process of market dynamics with the interplay of not just entry and exit but 
also profit as the indicator of competition (Kirzner, 1973).  Implementing this view in the world 
of economic modeling immediately raises the question how the interplay of entry, exit and 
profits works; particularly distinguishing between short term relationships where the classical 
assumption of fixed technology may be more realistic and longer term effects where entrants 
may introduce new disruptive technologies to the market.   
 
The present paper specifies a full equilibrium model explaining entry, exit and profit while also 
capturing the duration of disequilibrium and patterns of adjustment.  We account for both short 
and long run effects making use of a rich data set on Dutch retailing.  We construct a dynamic 
simultaneous equilibrium model of entry, exit and profits allowing for both short- and long-run 
effects in order to capture the Schumpeterian disequilibrium effects as well as the conventional 
Austrian equilibrium effects of entrepreneurial entry, exit and profit.  In this fashion we can also 
discriminate between three dimensions of the adjustment process towards a new equilibrium: net 
change of the entry, exit and profit levels as well as Schultz’s time and pattern of these changes.  
To our knowledge this is the first empirical analysis of the simultaneous interrelationship 
between entry, exit and industry profits.  The model we propose will be investigated using four 
types of one-time shocks: to profits, the number of entrants, the number of exits and consumer 
spending.  Telling the story of the adjustment process to a new equilibrium using shocks and 
discriminating between three dimensions is the main contribution of the present paper.  Previous 
analyses have only investigated these effects on a partial equilibrium basis.  Therefore, this 
analysis sheds light on the validity and strength of (once presumed, competing) economic 
models of entry and exit that have dominated debate in industrial economics for most of the last 
century. 
 
The next section of the paper provides a description of the data.  This is followed by the 
specification of the model in section three.  The results are discussed in the succeeding section 
with a focus on the analysis of impulse response functions.  Section five concludes.  
2. Data  
We investigate the interrelation between entry and exit levels, the number of firms and profit 
levels.  These four variables are the key variables in an error-correction model which we will 
develop in the next section.  The model is estimated using data for a panel of shop types in the 
Dutch retail sector.2  The current section describes the measurement and data sources for the key 
variables of our model as well as for the other covariates.  This section also provides some 
descriptive statistics and a series of tests on stationarity and cointegration for the key variables 
in our analysis.  The results of these tests are used to develop our error-correction model in the 
next section.  But first entry and exit rates of ten developed countries for a recent period are 
discussed. 3 
 
From Table 1 it is clear that in practice, entry and exit rates are not equal to zero, and they are 
often also not equal to each other.  Instead, firm entry and exit are observed to be a persistent 
feature of these economies.  Taken together these observations indicate that disequilibria are 
likely to be vital characteristics of modern economies.  Hence, the assumptions on the role of 
                                        
2 The industries in our data base are defined at (approximately) fourth digit level. Hence, these industries are quite 
narrowly defined. Because firms in the retail sector are almost always shops, we use the terms shop type and 
industry interchangeably throughout this paper. 
3 In Table 1, an entry is defined as a new firm (either a new-firm start-up or a new subsidiary company), where at 
least one person is active for at least one hour per week (i.e. it has to be an active new firm). An exit occurs when 
an active firm leaves the market, either voluntarily or involuntarily. See EIM (2009) for details. 
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entry and exit made in the classical economic framework may be overly restrictive by ignoring 
an entrepreneurial function. 
Table 1: Entry and exit as a percentage of the number of firms, 1997-2006 
Entry Exit 
 1997 2000 2003 2006 1997 2000 2003 2006 
Belgium 7.2 6.7 6.5 8.4 6.7 6.8 6.1 6.3 
Denmark 10.4 11.7 10.8 13.3 10.0 9.5 10.5 13.3 
Finland 9.7 8.6 9.4 11.5 7.8 7.4 7.6 7.9 
France  6.8 6.9 7.8 6.6 7.0 5.5 4.8 5.2 
Germany 12.0 9.6 9.7 8.1 8.0 7.1 6.9 6.8 
Ireland 13.1 15.1 12.5 14.5 7.9 5.7 3.8 7.6 
Italy 6.9 7.7 7.3 7.6 6.3 5.4 5.9 6.7 
Netherlands 10.2 11.1 8.0 10.5 5.5 6.1 6.5 6.4 
United Kingdom 12.7 13.3 13.2 12.1 11.0 13.1 12.7 9.3 
United States 12.2 10.1 9.2 9.9 9.5 8.9 8.7 9.1 
Source: EIM (2009). 
 
Our data set 
We use a data base for 41 shop types in the retail sector over the period 1980-2000.  Our data 
base combines variables from two major sources: the Dutch Central Registration Office (CRK) 
and a panel of independent Dutch retailers (establishments) called ‘Bedrijfssignaleringssysteem’ 
(BSS) (interfirm comparison system) which was operated by EIM Business and Policy Research 
in Zoetermeer.  The data are complemented using information from several sources.  As the 
number of shop types investigated in BSS has varied in the 1980s and 1990s, our data base is an 
unbalanced panel. By and large, we have 28 shop types with data for the 1980s and 1990s and 
13 shop types with data for the 1990s only.  The exact data period per shop type is given in 
Table 2. The table also contains averages for some key variables in our model. Details on the 
measurement and source for each variable are given below.  We apply several corrections to the 
raw data in order to make the data ready for analysis. 
 
Raw data on the number of firms (N) and the numbers of entries (E) and exits (X) are obtained 
from the Dutch Central Registration Office (CRK).  CRK provides data on the number of new 
registrations and deregistrations of establishments for each shop type.  Over time the sectoral 
classification of shop types used by CRK changed several times and we correct for trend breaks 
because of these changes.  
 
Total industry profits ( ) are computed by multiplying average profits per firm by the total 
number of firms in a shop type.  Raw data on average (net) profit per firm are taken from BSS.  
This panel was started by EIM in the 1970s and each year a large number of firms were asked 
for their financial performance.  Although the panel changes from year to year (each year some 
firms exit the panel while some others enter), it is important to note that we compute the relative 
change in average profit based on only those firms present in the panel in two consecutive years.  
Hence, the dynamics of these variables are not influenced by changes in the composition of the 
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panel.4  Until the beginning of the 1990s average profit levels are computed based on about 
seventy individual retail stores per shop type but from the beginning of the 1990s the coverage 
of the panel decreases, i.e., less firms participate so that shop type averages become less reliable.  
Fortunately, the timing of this decrease coincides with the start of average financial performance 
registration by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) at low sectoral aggregation levels.  Hence, from the 
early 1990s onwards, we have information on the development over time of these variables from 
two sources: BSS and CBS.  Differences between these two sources are small which supports 
the reliability of our constructed times series.  From 1994 onwards we use the average of the 
annual relative change implied by these two sources.5 
 
Data on total consumer spending on the products and services sold in a certain shop type is 
taken from Statistics Netherlands (publication ‘Budgetonderzoeken’ or Budget statistics).6  The 
variables modal income and unemployment are also taken from Statistics Netherlands, while the 
(nominal) interest rates are taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream, a provider of financial 
data.7.  Finally, for total industry profits, modal income, consumer spending, and the nominal 
interest rate, we use a consumer price index to correct for inflation. 
 
In Table 2 we give an overview of the available data.  Table 2 shows that some shop types have 
grown in terms of the number of shops over the sample period, while other shop types have 
shrunk.  For instance, the average number of entrants for the shop type “grocers/supermarkets” 
is 743 while over the same period of time the average number of exits equals 932.  This implies 
that the category shrunk with, on average, 189 shops each year.  Over the entire sample period 
of 21 years this category shrunk with about 189 x 21 = 3969 stores.  Note that at the same time 
this category witnessed an inflation-corrected yearly profit decrease of about 0.7% and an 
increase in consumer spending of about 0.3%.  In all shop types there are relatively many stores 
entering the market and relatively many shops leaving the market (relative to the number of 
firms).  In some shop types entry dominates exit, while in others exit dominates entry.  
Remarkably, even in shop types where there is no net change in the number of stores, there are 
still entrants and exits.  For example, the category “fish shops” has on average 114 stores 
entering and 114 stores exiting the market, corresponding to 11% of the population of firms.  
Table 2 clearly shows that entry and exit levels are significantly positive over a longer period of 
time.  This suggests that the “classical idea” of a steady-state level with entry and exit rates 
equal to zero is not a sufficient account of the patterns in the data.  It seems that there exists a 
long-term persistent level of entry and exit in each shop type.  As explained earlier, the current 
paper develops a model where these long-term entry and exit levels are explicitly specified. 
                                        
4 Hence we choose a base year to compute the level of average profits or turnover, and next we compute the levels 
for the other years making use of the relative changes of only those firms present in two consecutive years. As most 
firms stayed in the panel for many years, these relative changes are also based on a substantial number of firms, but 
this way we correct for trend breaks introduced by a changing composition of the panel (e.g. when a firm with 
exceptionally high profits would enter or exit the panel). For the base year we always choose a year for which the 
number of participating firms in the panel is high. 
5 Ideally, one would like to use information from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) as this is the national statistical 
office in the Netherlands. However, as the number of firms in a shop type (which is approximately fourth digit 
level) is often small, and the number of firms is rounded to thousands in CBS statistics, using the CBS data also 
implies some extent of measurement error. Therefore we use information from both sources to estimate the 
dynamic pattern of the profit and turnover variables. 
6 Total consumer spending was computed by multiplying the variables average household spending, the total 
number of households in the Netherlands and the share of a certain shop type in total household spending. 
7 See www.datastream.com. In particular we used the series HOLIB1Y. 
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Table 2: Shop types and key summary statistics  
 
Time span Avg. no. 
firms 
Avg. no. 
entries 
Avg. no. 
exits 
Avg. profit 
growth 1 
Avg. growth 
consumer 
spending 1 
  ( N ) ( E ) ( X ) ( log ) ( CSlog ) 
grocers/supermarkets  1980-2000 9044 743 932 -0.0074 0.0033 
butchers   1980-2000 5885 448 590 -0.0443 -0.0222 
greengrocers   1980-2000 4489 458 595 -0.0330 0.0014 
fish shops  1980-2000 1019 114 114 0.0046 0.0095 
bakers   1980-2000 5353 403 485 -0.0153 -0.0027 
confectioners  1980-2000 2092 276 306 -0.0064 0.0094 
tobacco shops  1980-2000 3421 149 270 -0.0141 -0.0050 
liquor stores  1980-2000 2627 258 321 -0.0030 -0.0005 
textiles men’s wear  1989-2000 4986 190 399 -0.0180 0.0274 
shoe stores 1980-2000 3598 291 325 0.0126 0.0073 
households goods shops 1980-2000 2559 273 289 -0.0151 0.0041 
furniture   1980-2000 4840 421 386 0.0596 -0.0165 
furnishing + furniture (mixed) 1980-2000 4090 216 280 -0.0449 0.0069 
paint, glass and wall-paper   1980-2000 5891 251 361 -0.0013 -0.0016 
hardware stores   1980-2000 6364 266 333 0.0035 -0.0074 
bicycle stores 1980-2000 4129 187 239 0.0166 0.0204 
photographer’s shops  1980-2000 1806 149 150 0.0126 -0.0099 
Jewelers 1980-2000 2585 232 221 0.0302 0.0250 
drug stores 1980-2000 2982 228 216 0.0288 0.0353 
Florists 1980-2000 5475 874 883 0.0112 0.0077 
pet shops   1980-2000 2119 227 221 0.0131 0.0106 
Poultry 1992-2000 711 55 82 -0.0212 -0.0128 
dairy shops   1980-2000 4350 181 336 -0.0518 -0.0029 
Reform 1989-2000 1801 223 152 0.1198 -0.0061 
baby’s clothing  1989-2000 1537 225 218 0.0880 0.0522 
children’s clothing 1989-2000 1697 264 198 0.0535 0.0578 
textiles underwear 1989-2000 739 160 115 0.1073 0.0772 
clothing materials 1989-2000 1795 92 176 -0.0098 -0.0260 
leather goods  1989-2000 875 100 104 -0.0115 0.0126 
electrics   1980-2000 3472 236 305 -0.0111 0.0064 
audiovisual devices  1980-2000 3211 538 471 0.0421 0.0021 
musical instruments   1989-2000 772 75 68 0.0480 0.0108 
sewing-machines   1980-2000 463 34 46 -0.0427 -0.0192 
do-it-yourself shop 1989-2000 3886 486 389 0.0632 -0.0011 
glass, porcelain and pottery  1980-2000 3567 341 322 0.0275 -0.0064 
office and school materials   1980-2000 1327 125 123 -0.0369 0.0263 
opticians   1980-2000 1607 160 121 0.0818 0.0776 
videotheques  1989-1997 714 295 284 0.0593 0.0131 
gardening centers 1989-2000 532 103 71 0.1294 0.0833 
Toys 1980-2000 1072 183 144 0.1043 0.0302 
sport and camping equipment 1990-2000 2849 382 276 0.0462 0.0577 
1 Corrected for inflation. 
 
Testing for stationarity and cointegration 
Before we specify our model we test the key series for stationarity.  To this end we use panel 
unit root tests.  There are basically two sets of panel unit root tests. The first set assumes a 
 7
common AR structure across panel members under the null and a common AR structure under 
the alternative.  Popular examples are the Levin et al. (2002) test and the Breitung (2000) t- 
statistic.  The second set of tests assumes individual AR structures.  Popular examples in this 
class are the Im et al. (2003) W-statistic, and the Fisher-type tests (Maddala and Wu, 1999 and 
Choi, 2001).  The alternative hypothesis in this second class of tests is that some of the panel 
members are stationary.  We use the tests as they are implemented in EViews 6, with all the 
“automatic” options for lag and bandwidth selection.  If the majority of the series show a trend 
we use the tests with the option of individual deterministic trends.  Our final conclusion is based 
on the combined results of the tests.  Note that the tests may contradict each other.  Furthermore, 
our sample size is relatively small so that we should not expect a very large power of the tests 
nor can we be sure that the size of the tests is correct.  We therefore see the results of these tests 
as a way to provide some further descriptive data.  
 
We summarize the test results in Table 3. The log entry and log exit series do not appear to have 
a trend.  The test results clearly indicate that the log entry and log exit series do not contain a 
unit root.  For the number of firms we have to correct for possible deterministic trends.  The 
tests clearly show that the log of the number of firms is not stationary.  Note that entry and exit 
together measure the change in number of firms.  For the log total profit and the log consumer 
spending in the shop type it is not so clear whether the series contain a trend.  Therefore, we 
present the results for the tests without correcting for trends as well as those where the trend 
correction is made. Table 3 clearly shows that the log consumer spending does not contain a unit 
root.  For the log of the total profit the results are less clear.  We decide to classify this series as 
non-stationary.  
Table 3: p-values of panel unit root tests (H0: unit root (common or individual)) 
  Common unit root process Individual unit root processes 
 Trend in Levin, Lin Breitung Im, Pesaran and ADF – Fisher PP – Fisher 
  test? and Chu t* t-stat Shin W-stat Chi-square Chi-square 
log E no 0.003 - 0.005 0.002 0.000 
log X yes 0.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log N yes 0.889 1.000 1.000 0.938 1.000 
log  no 0.027 - 0.219 0.127 0.351 
 yes 0.000 0.334 0.001 0.000 0.003 
log CS no 0.000 - 0.010 0.001 0.004 
  yes 0.000 0.659 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
We next test for cointegration between the number of firms and profits.  In our panel set-up we 
test for cointegration by testing the hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals of a panel 
regression of log profit on log number of firms.  Note that this hypothesis corresponds to no 
cointegration.  More specifically we apply the procedure of Pedroni (1999, 2004).  This 
procedure is similar to the Engle and Granger (1987) method for a single time series.  Again we 
use this method as implemented in EViews 6 with all the automatic options.  There are a number 
of different test statistics available.  However, note that all of these tests are strictly speaking not 
valid.  The tests all make the assumption that the cross-sections are independent.  This is not 
likely to hold as all shop types are dependent on the development of the Dutch economy.  
Overall the results are mixed.  After correcting for trends the Panel PP-Statistic as well as the 
Panel ADF-Statistic give a p-value of 0.  This corresponds to the existence of cointegration 
between the two variables.  However, other indicators point in the opposite direction.  The exact 
reason for this apparent contradiction is extremely difficult to find.  We attribute the finding to a 
possibly low power of these particular tests.  Here we come to the overall conclusion that the 
profits and the number of firms are indeed cointegrated.  
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3. Model 
In the below model we will discriminate between the short term disequilibrating and long term 
equilibrating roles of entry and exit while making room for an analysis of the net change, the 
duration and the pattern of the move from the initial to the next equilibrium. 
Denote by it the total profit in shop type i = 1, …, N during year t = 1,….,Ti. Next, Eit and Xit 
give the number of firms entering and exiting the market for shop type i in year t.  Finally, Nit 
gives the number of firms in market i at the beginning of year t.  The number of firms at the 
beginning of year t+1 is therefore given by Nit+1 = Nit + Eit  Xit.  In this section we develop a 
model describing the log of the total profits as well as the log of the number of entrants and the 
log of the number of exits.  Note that this model also implicitly describes the number of firms. 
We specify a model in which the changes in entry, exit and profit are related to short-term 
dynamics, changes in exogenous variables and to deviations to the steady-state of the market.  
We denote the exogenous variables related to market i in year t by Zit.  We specify an error-
correction model for all three endogenous variables, which is consistent with the earlier findings 
that log entry and log exit are stationary and that log profits and log number of firms are 
cointegrated.  We specify 
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where log Eit*, log Xit* and log it* denote the steady state levels for log entry, log exit and log 
profit, respectively.  The steady state levels depend on exogenous variables describing the 
market situations.  These variables are denoted by EitW , 
X
itW , and 

itW .  Consistent with the 
finding of cointegration, the steady state relation for profit also involves the number of firms. 
We model these steady state levels as 
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For the steady state relation of profit and number of firms we allow for a trend.  We therefore 
allow that the average profit increases or decreases in the steady state without a change in the 
number of firms or the market.  Conversely, the number of firms could change in the 
equilibrium without an effect on the profits.  The latter case would correspond to a difference in 
the equilibrium levels of entry and exit.  One could test various restrictions on i.  Another 
interesting hypothesis to test is whether “on average” log Eit* = log Xit*.  This would imply that 
in the steady state the market does not grow or shrink.  To formalize this hypothesis, we will 
mean center the variables in Wit such that the hypothesis can be stated as γ1i = γ2i.  
 
The error terms are expected to be correlated within a market.  In particular, we expect a 
positive correlation between entry and exit.  We assume that there is no correlation over time or 
across markets.  That is, we specify 
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To economize on the number of parameters we restrict the covariance structure such that the 
correlations are the same across markets. We parameterize the variance such that 
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The ρ-parameters now denote the correlations between different error terms, while for example 
2
i  gives the variance of the error term associated with log entry for shop type i. 
Operationalization of variables 
We estimate our model for the earlier mentioned collection of shop types (industries) in the 
retail sector in the Netherlands, for the period 1980-2000. We use the following variables: 
 
Key variables 
Eit number of entries in shop type i during year t 
Xit number of exits in shop type i during year t 
Nit number of firms in shop type i at start of year t 
it total industry profit in shop type i in year t (in 1990 prices) 
 
Variables included in vector W 
modal income average modal income (in 1990 prices)  
consumer spending total consumer spending in shop type (in 1990 prices)  
unemployment number of unemployed (in millions)  
 
Variables included in vector Z 
Vector Z contains the same variables as vector W.  In addition, the real interest rate is included. 
Explanation of variables included in the model 
Equation (1) of our model describes the interrelations between entry, exit and total industry 
profits.  Many studies of industrial organization model the interrelation between entry and exit 
(e.g. Carree and Thurik, 1996, Burke and van Stel, 2009).  When a firm leaves the market, there 
is room for entry (replacement).  When a firm enters the market, some other firm may be forced 
to leave the market because it is no longer competitive enough (displacement).  Also, when 
profits in an industry are high, this attracts more firms (positive effect on entry) and incentives 
for firms to leave the market are low (negative effect on exit).  Furthermore, when entry, exit or 
profits are above or below equilibrium, error-correction will cause these variables to move 
towards the steady-state level again.  All these type of interactions between entry, exit and 
profits are captured by the coefficients contained in matrices A (short-term effects) and  
(adjustment effects) in (1).  
 
Vector Z in (1) contains exogenous explanatory variables for (changes in) entry, exit and profit 
levels.  In our application the vector includes the variables modal income, consumer spending, 
unemployment and real interest rate.  Modal income acts as an opportunity cost for running a 
 10
retail shop, and hence this variable is expected to have a negative impact on entry and a positive 
impact on exit.  Furthermore, an increase in modal income level may signal an overall upturn of 
the economy from which shopkeepers benefit as well (Carree and Thurik, 1994).  Hence the 
expected impact on profits is positive.  The growth rate of consumer expenditure on the goods 
and services sold in a shop type is an indicator for demand growth.  This variable is expected to 
have a positive impact on entry, a negative impact on exit, and a positive impact on profits.  
Changes in unemployment may have a positive effect on entry as the (newly) unemployed may 
have limited alternative employment options in the wage sector (Thurik et al., 2008).  Increasing 
unemployment rates are also a disincentive to exit as economic circumstances are not favorable 
to find a different occupation.  Increasing unemployment will also put pressure on profit levels 
(expected effect on profits negative).  High interest rates, finally, make running a business more 
expensive, hence the expected impact on entry is negative.  Also, profit levels may be lower 
when interest rates are high. 
 
With the exception of the real interest rate, the variables from vector Z are also included in the 
vector W capturing the long-term influences on entry, exit and profits.  By and large, the 
arguments are the same as for the short-term impacts described above.  The interest rate is not 
included in the long-run relationships for two reasons.  First, the interest rate appears to be 
nonstationary.  Therefore this variable cannot be related to the steady state levels of the 
stationary variables entry and exit.  Second, the interest rate is expected to only affect the 
markets in the short run.  That is, the interest rate mainly influences the moment to start a 
business (hence an impact in the short run) but not the decision as such to start a business.  To 
the contrary modal incomes (indicator of opportunity costs), consumer spending (indicator of 
shop type-specific demand) and unemployment (indicator of general business conditions) may 
be seen as more structural, long-run, impacts on entry and exit.  Note that the effects of 
unemployment in the long-run equations may be different from those in the short-term.  In 
particular, the positive effect of unemployment on entry may be a short-term effect only, 
primarily relating to individuals who have just recently become unemployed, and want to start a 
business.  In the long-term though, a structurally high level of unemployment indicates bad 
conditions for running businesses, implying a negative relation with entry.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the profit equation also includes the number of firms.  A higher number of 
firms or a higher level of total industry profits reflect a bigger market hence the expected 
relationship is positive.8  What is interesting is whether the parameter for the number of firms in 
the long-run profit equation (equation 2 in the model) is bigger or smaller than one.  Note that 
we can rewrite the long-run relation for total profit as 
 
tNW
N iititiit
it   



log)1('log 33
*
.    (5) 
 
The left hand side of this equilibrium relation gives the profit per firm.  A  coefficient in excess 
of one suggests a positive relation between the equilibrium profit per firm and the number of 
firms.  This implies that more firms leads to larger profits per firm.  In other words, total 
industry profits increase disproportionally with an increase in number of firms.  On the contrary, 
a coefficient smaller than one corresponds to decreasing average profits per firm.  
                                        
8 A coefficient of zero would imply that total industry profits remains the same (i.e. the market does not get bigger) 
when the number of firms increases, implying that the average profits per firm decrease proportionally with the 
increase in firms. 
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4. Estimation results  
We use the model as described in (1) to (4) to analyze 41 different shop types in the Dutch retail 
sector.  Parameter estimation is done by numerically maximizing the log likelihood function 
using Ox 5.1 (Doornik, 2007).  The likelihood function can straightforwardly be obtained from 
the model specification.  
 
We present the estimation results in Table 4. First we comment on the long-run relationships.  
Modal income is negatively related to the long-run levels of entry and exit.  This implies that if 
the modal income is high there are fewer firms entering the market and fewer firms leaving the 
market at any point in time.  In other words, there is less turbulence.9  The impact of modal 
income on entry is the largest, this perfectly corresponds to our conjecture that modal income 
acts as opportunity costs.  Modal income and consumer spending have a positive impact on the 
long-run total profit levels.  In this case, both variables indicate good economic conditions.  The 
consumer spending also significantly impacts the long run entry and exit levels.  If consumer 
spending is high entry levels are high.  However, many of these entrants replace other firms as 
the coefficient of consumer spending on exit is comparable in magnitude and sign.  If 
unemployment is high, business conditions are bad.  Hence few firms enter the market and few 
firms exit.  Turbulence in this case will be low.  The equilibrium profit levels turn out to be 
significantly related to the number of firms.  More firms correspond to higher total profit levels 
in equilibrium.  However, the increase in profit levels is not large enough, that is average profit 
per firm decreases as the number of firms increases.  The parameter estimate is not significantly 
different from one though. 
 
The estimates for the adjustment parameters presented in Table 4 give insight in the way an out-
of-equilibrium situation is corrected.  If the entry level is too high relative to the equilibrium 
level this leads to a short-term decrease in entrants in the next period and a short-term increase 
in the number of exits.  The impact on profit levels is negligible.  Interestingly, if the exit level 
is too high, this only gets corrected by a lower exit level in the next period.  The entry rates and 
profit levels are not directly affected.  Finally, excessive profits are corrected through a change 
in profits itself and by a (temporarily) higher number of entrants, who are attracted by the high 
profit level.  
 
The short-run effects of the (lagged) endogenous variables can be best shown using impulse 
response functions.  Such functions give insight on how external shocks affect all variables.  The 
short-run effects of the exogenous variables are easier to evaluate as they correspond to the 
direct impact of a particular change.  The direct impact of an increase in modal income is that 
entry levels drop and profit levels increase.  The magnitude of these effects is relatively large.  
An increase in consumer spending again leads to a direct change in entry and profits: both 
variables increase.  An increase in unemployment directly leads to an increase in entry and a 
decrease in profit.  Finally, the interest rate has a direct impact on entry: an increase in the 
interest rate corresponds to lower entry levels as expected. 
 
Finally, we discuss the estimated correlation structure.  We find a relatively large correlation 
(0.42) between the error terms associated with entry and exit.  This positive correlation implies 
that many shocks lead to a change in both variables, that is, they tend to affect turbulence.  The 
correlation between the errors in entry or exit and profit are rather small.  
                                        
9 Turbulence is the sum of entry and exit. 
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Table 4: Parameter estimates for model given in (1) – (4), standard errors in parentheses 
 Δlog Eit Δlog Xit Δlog it 
Long-run relationship    
Log modal income -4.815 *** -2.862 **  0.913 ** 
 (1.527)  (1.235)  (0.378)  
Log consumer spending 0.669 ***  0.535 ***  0.185 ** 
 (0.217)  (0.178)  (0.091)  
Log unemployment -0.552 ** -0.374 ** -0.095  
 (0.215)  (0.174)  (0.062)  
Log Nit -  -   0.797 *** 
     (0.266)  
Adjustment parameters       
log Eit-1-log E*it-1 -0.290 ***  0.307 ***  0.050 * 
 (0.047)  (0.032)  (0.027)  
log Xit-1-log X*it-1 -0.040  -0.544 *** -0.028  
 (0.052)  (0.040)  (0.037)  
log it-1-log *it-1 0.276 *** -0.008  -0.579 *** 
 (0.068)  (0.074)  (0.037)  
Short-run effects       
Δlog Eit-1 -0.071  -0.014   0.055 *** 
 (0.047)  (0.034)  (0.021)  
Δlog Xit-1 0.044  -0.147 *** -0.023  
 (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.023)  
Δlog it-1 -0.179 *** -0.127 **  0.082 ** 
 (0.065)  (0.051)  (0.035)  
Δlog modal incomet -2.055 ***  0.125   1.669 *** 
 (0.484)  (0.363)  (0.210)  
Δlog consumer spendingt 0.223 **  0.059   0.132 *** 
 (0.102)  (0.073)  (0.051)  
Δlog unemploymentt 0.314 ***  0.011  -0.169 *** 
 (0.062)  (0.047)  (0.036)  
Δreal interest ratet -0.004 ***  0.000   0.001  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Estimated correlation structure 










1019.0040.0
019.01416.0
040.0416.01
 
*,**,***: parameter is significantly different from 0 at 10%, 5%, or 1%, respectively 
Impulse response analysis 
In this section we use impulse response functions to study the impact of shocks to a market in 
equilibrium.  We consider impulse response functions for four types of one-time shocks which 
give an insight into the economic development of the retail industry: a shock to profits, to the 
number of entrants, to the number of exits and to consumer spending.  In each of these cases we 
investigate three dimensions of the adjustment process to equilibrium caused by the impact of 
these shocks: net change, time and pattern.  Net change measures the total effect of the shock 
comparing the initial and the new equilibrium states.  It is the Schumpeterian element of our 
investigation.  Time is about the duration of disequilibrium between these states.  It tests 
Schultz’s assumption that disequilibrium is the norm rather than a rarity.  Pattern is about the 
route that the adjustment process takes from the initial to the new equilibrium.  Its analysis is 
important because most economic analyses are based upon comparative statics and monotonic 
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adjustment processes.  In all cases we consider a situation in which in the steady state there is no 
growth in the number of firms or total industry profits, that is, log E*=log X* and i=0.  This 
situation enables an analysis of the effect of shocks.  Furthermore, we assume that all exogenous 
variables are constant and equal to the observed mean value over time.  Of course, in the case of 
the shock to consumer spending all other exogenous variables are assumed constant.  In other 
words, we consider a one-time purely exogenous shock to a stable system.  The size of the shock 
is taken as 1% of the steady state value prior to the shock.  To initialize the simulation of the 
shock we need to set the initial number of firms.  We select the first shop type available in the 
sample and use the first observed value of the number of firms as the initial value.  The results 
do depend on this choice of initial value.  This holds especially for the impact on the number of 
firms.  The size of the shock on entry and exit is taken relative to its steady state.  Depending on 
the turbulence in the shop type the resulting number of entrants or exits can be relatively small 
or relatively large.  
 
Figure 1 shows the impact of a 1% shock to profits on five elements of the model including 
relative change in entry, exit, total profit, number of firms and profit per firm.  Note that the 
various graphs have different scales on the y-axis.  The graph shows that the impact on total 
industry profits reduces quickly over the course of the succeeding four to five years.  Note 
however that the effect of the shock does not completely die out.  In the end the profits are 
0.04% higher.  The effects on entry, exit and the number of firms are longer lasting.  After the 
shock there is more entry and fewer exits.  In later periods the entry rate stays above the original 
steady state level and the peak in the effect is obtained in year 4.  For exit we find that the initial 
drop in the number of exits is followed by a rise.  Probably some of the additional entrants either 
displace incumbent firms or exit the market relatively quickly.  The model implies that the entry 
and exit levels return to their original steady state levels.  The total number of firms increases 
permanently with about 0.05% as a result of the shock.  In the long run the shock has almost no 
impact on the average profit per firm.  It turns out to be slightly smaller than before the shock.  
Note that this is consistent with the parameter for log N being smaller than one in the long-run 
profit equation. 
 
In terms of the three dimensions of the adjustment process to equilibrium, we observe that the 
positive shock to profits is informative.  First, we note that while there are no long term changes 
to entry and exit, the short term rise in profits causes a permanent increase in the number of 
firms.  This is associated with lower average profits per firm but higher total industry profits.  
Therefore, in terms of net change the shock to profits has a permanent effect on the economic 
size of the retail industry.  Second, the timing of this adjustment process lasts approximately five 
years between the initial and the new equilibrium for profits but 15 years for entry, exit and the 
total number of firms.  Thirdly, the pattern of the adjustment process is in part fairly 
straightforward – after the profit shock net entry rises and the rise in the total number of firms 
causes profits to converge monotonically to the new equilibrium.  However, the exit rate 
oscillates, initially ‘undershooting’ and then ‘overshooting’ the long run equilibrium. 
 
Hence, as a result of the positive shock to profits, the number of firms permanently increases 
and the average profit per firm permanently decreases.  However, the latter effect is smaller than 
the former effect, implying a permanent increase in total industry profits.  If we interpret the 
shock in profits as some kind of product differentiation or innovation by some incumbents (the 
industry induces a higher willingness to pay by offering new and more valuable products or 
services), we see that this has a small but lasting positive effect on the size of the market, both in 
terms of the number of firms and in terms of total industry profits. The turbulence (high entry 
and exit rates) in the first decade after the shock are a clear sign of the learning process of the 
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industry: entry through use of new technology and exits as a result of being unable to keep up 
with the new technology. 
 
Figure 1: Effect of a 1% shock to total industry profits, all graphs give the change relative 
to the steady state levels prior to the shock. 
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.1
0.2
0.3
Rel. change in entry: (EtE¯ t)/E¯ t 
0 5 10 15 20 25
-0.1
0.0
0.1
Rel. change in exit: (XtX¯ t)/X¯ t 
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.5
1.0
Rel. change in total profit: (t¯t)/¯t 
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.025
0.050
Rel. change in number of firms: (NtN¯t)/N¯t 
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.0
0.5
1.0
Rel. change in profit/firm: (t/Nt¯ t/N¯t)/(¯t /N¯t) 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the result of a 1% shock to entry on the five elements of the model including 
relative change in entry, exit, total profit, number of firms and profit per firm. The result of this 
shock is to cause more exit for at least 15 years, and permanently higher levels of total profits 
and the number of firms.  However, since the increase in the number of firms is slightly larger 
than the increase in total profits, the average profit per firm decreases by about 0.02%.   
 
Hence, similar to the shock to profits (Figure 1), as a result of the positive shock to entry, total 
profits as well as the number of firms permanently increase and the average profit per firm 
permanently decreases. In terms of the three dimensions of the adjustment process to 
equilibrium, we again observe the shock to entry is insightful.  First we note that while there are 
no long term changes to entry and exit, the short term rise in net entry causes a permanent 
increase in the number of firms.  This is associated with lower average profits per firm but 
higher total industry profits.  Therefore, in terms of net change the shock to entry has a 
permanent effect on the economic size and competitiveness of the retail industry.  Second, the 
timing of this adjustment process is far from instantaneous lasting approximately ten years 
between the initial and the new equilibrium.  Thirdly, the pattern of the adjustment process is 
non monotonic but oscillates before it settles on a convergent path towards the new equilibrium.  
This is particularly noticeable with profits per firm which first ‘overshoots’ and then 
‘undershoots’ before finally converging towards the new equilibrium.   
 
If we interpret the shock to entry as driven by an entrepreneurial desire to introduce innovation 
we see that it causes a permanent increase in the size of an industry and total industry profits.  In 
the process it causes a turbulent environment for firms with long periods of disequilibrium and 
with profits per firm fluctuating before finally converging on lower average profit levels per 
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firm.  The question now is why this shock leads to reduced firm level profits and more firms.  
The story could be as follows: first, while firm-level sales are reduced, prices may increase.  The 
reason is that the entrant now offers a more customized product to some of the consumers 
incumbent firms were selling to.  These were the most price-sensitive consumers previously 
(they switch because they were not satisfied with existing products, hence had the lowest 
willingness to pay).  With the most price-sensitive customers gone, incumbent firms raise their 
prices because there is no point going after those who now have a product available that they 
like much better.  This all explains why industry sales and prices, hence industry profits, may 
increase after entry.  It is also consistent with reduced firm-level profits: incumbent firms have 
lower sales.  Second, after the differentiated entry, the incumbents have an incentive to also 
differentiate their products from each other, in order to limit price competition.  As a result, the 
market becomes more segmented.  This may open up more niches for additional entrants and, as 
is shown in Figure 2, there may be an exit wave after some time where entrepreneurs realize that 
the niche they targeted was not profitable enough.  Hence the ‘entry causes more entry’ 
relationship. 
 
Figure 2: Effect of a 1% shock to entry, all graphs give the change relative to the steady 
state levels prior to the shock. 
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An exogenous shock to the number of exits has a somewhat different impact.  Figure 3 shows 
that, although initially this shock results in more entrants, overall the shock leads to less entrants 
during a relatively long period of time.  However, the size of this impact is relatively small (note 
the different scales on the y-axes for entry and exit).  In the new steady state profit levels have 
decreases by more than 0.10%, the number of firms has decreased by about 0.14%.  In terms of 
average profit per firm, this shock leads to an increase of approximately 0.03%. 
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In terms of the three dimensions of the adjustment process to equilibrium, we observe the 
following.  First we note that there is no permanent change to the equilibrium rate of entry and 
exit.  However, there is a net decrease in the equilibrium number of firms and industry profit 
meaning that the industry does not fully recover its initial equilibrium. The equilibrium average 
profit per firm rises; associated with the fall in the total number of firms.  Second, the timing of 
the adjustment process to the new equilibrium is slow taking between ten to fifteen years.  
Thirdly, the pattern of the adjustment process is not monotonic.  Initially the shock to exit has a 
sustained affect causing the exit rate to stay above equilibrium for 6 years, over and beyond 
which the entry rate also falls below the long run equilibrium, so that both then contribute to the 
net fall in the total number of firms.  Hence, in the case of a positive shock to exit the striking 
result is that the market never fully recovers: the size of the market decreases, both in terms of 
the number of firms, and in terms of total industry profit.10   
 
Figure 3: Effect of a 1% shock to exit, all graphs give the change relative to the steady 
state levels prior to the shock. 
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Figure 4 shows that a shock in consumer spending leads to more entry and exit for at least 15 
years while leading to a higher number of firms and total profits. Since the increase in the 
number of firms is slightly higher than the increase in total profits, average profits per firm 
decreases.  
 
In terms of the three dimensions of the adjustment process to equilibrium, we first note that 
there are no long term changes to entry and exit.  However, the shock in consumer spending 
leads to permanent increase in the number of firms.  This is associated with lower average 
                                        
10 An interpretation is that a demand shock is at the origin of industry events. Marginal firms cannot keep up with a 
change in consumer preferences and leave the market.  The adapting incumbents together with differentiated 
entrants are able to convince consumers to lower their price sensitivity given their new taste.  As can be seen in 
Figure 3, entry is frustrated with a delay after the change in consumer preferences because of uncertainty signalled 
by the wave of exits.  The resulting higher prices lead to higher industry profits in an altogether smaller market.  
Those firms which ‘survive’ the shock to exit are slightly better off, as average profits increase. 
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profits per firm but higher industry profits.  The shock in consumer spending appears to have a 
permanent effect on economic size and competitiveness of the industry.  Second, the timing is 
again far from instantaneous: it seems that the number of firms and industry profits are close to 
their new equilibrium while in the subsequent decade there is still some turbulence (entry and 
exit).  Third, the pattern of the adjustment process is not monotonic but there is an upsurge in all 
variables before a monotonic path to equilibrium is reached.  The adjustment process of this 
shock to consumer spending is similar to that of entry with the exception that the early 
oscillations are weaker (of course, a one percent shock in consumer spending cannot be 
compared to a one percent shock in total entry).11   
Figure 4: Effect of a 1% shock to consumer spending, all graphs give the change relative to 
the steady state levels prior to the shock. 
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In general, the four shocks described above lead to permanent change in the industry, i.e., a new 
equilibrium.  In this process entrants are found to play two roles.  Initially, they perform an 
entrepreneurial function of creating disequilibrium; permanently undermining the existing 
equilibrium.  Thereafter they play the conventional equilibrating role of moving the industry to a 
new equilibrium.  For instance, a shock to exit has a permanent effect in that the market does not 
recover as opposed to one in profits which has a permanent positive effect on the size of the 
market.  These shocks cause a long period of disequilibrium, typically 10 to 15 years, indicating 
the importance of the entrepreneurial function of entry and exit.  This provides support for the 
                                        
11 An interpretation of this direct (consumer spending) demand shock is not necessarily similar to that of the 
indirect (entry) demand shock. An upward shift in consumer spending provokes entry of firms using a better 
technology.  This new competition leads to lower profits per firm while total industry profits as well as the number 
of firms grow due to increased consumer spending.  
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Schultzian view that disequilibrium is the norm rather than the oddity.  Moreover, we observe 
not only long periods of disequilibrium but also many non-monotonic adjustment processes 
which highlights their complexity.  Frequently these processes are initially ‘erratic’ before 
earnest convergence to the new equilibrium sets in. 
 
Surprisingly, we observe that in all four cases industry profits and number of firms move in the 
same direction: upwards in the case of a shock to profits, entrants and consumer spending and 
downwards in the case of a shock to exits.  Let us take the case of the entry shock.  There are 
two possible reasons why entry may be associated with higher long-term industry profits.  One 
is an exogenous and lasting increase in demand; the other is that the industry induces a higher 
willingness to pay by offering more valuable products (i.e., there is some kind of innovation).  
Distinguishing between these two causes of the entry shock is not possible given our present 
results.  In the demand-driven case, there is no reason why entrants, rather than incumbents, 
should respond to the shock.  For instance, it makes more sense for there to be an adjustment 
phase with entry and exit rates deviating from their normal levels if entry is innovative 
(differentiated) and thus has less certain consequences.  In the case of the direct shock in 
consumer spending entrants with a new technology bring about competition together with a 
turbulent phase involving both entry and exit while ultimately industry profits and number of 
firms increase. 
5. Conclusions 
The development of industries and economies is driven to a large extent by the process of entry 
and exit of firms. It is an important determinant of market performance in terms of productivity 
and structure. Much is known about the interplay between entry and exit (Carree and Thurik 
1996), their variability over time and industries (Geroski 1995) and the way they bring about 
change (Audretsch 1995; Baumol 2002; Bartelsman et al. 2004). The relation between profits 
and the number of firms in a market is another essential topic in the field of industrial 
organization.  Usually, the relation is modeled in an error-correction framework where profits 
and/or the number of firms respond to out-of-equilibrium situations.  In an out-of-equilibrium 
situation one or both of these variables deviate from some long-term sustainable level.  These 
models predict that in situations of equilibrium, the number of firms does not change and hence, 
entry equals exit.  Moreover, in equilibrium entry and exit are expected to be equal to zero.  
These predictions are at odds with real life observations showing that entry and exit levels are 
significantly positive in all markets of substantial size.  Moreover, entry and exit levels often 
differ drastically.  In this paper we develop a new model for the relation between profit levels 
and the number of firms by specifying not only an equation for the equilibrium level of profits in 
a market but also equations for the equilibrium levels of entry and exit.  In our empirical 
application we show that our entry and exit equations satisfy usual error-correction conditions.  
We also find that a one-time positive shock to entry, profits or consumer spending has a small 
but permanent positive effect on both the number of firms and total industry profits.  This can 
only be explained by the introduction of innovation and/or product differentiation. 
 
The results indicate that both the classical and entrepreneurial models of the interrelationship 
between entry, exit and profits have some empirical foundation.  Contrary to the premise for the 
stand off between classical economists and Schumpeterian and Austrian economists, the results 
show that these models coexist.  They both explain different parts of industry dynamics.  
Moreover, we created room for the Schultzian view that disequilibria are inevitable features of 
economic progress and measured the duration and patterns of these disequilibria.  We provide 
evidence of the length and the complexity of the adjustment processes.  This supports Schultz, 
Baumol and the Austrians when they argue that the main challenge of economics is to explain 
disequilibrium processes.  The results indicate that entry has a short term classical competitive 
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positive effect on exit as well as a Schumpeterian disequilibriating one.  But we also find a long 
term positive Austrian effect of entry on both the number of firms and total industry profits.  
This evidence is consistent with a view where entrants are entrepreneurial and have creative 
destruction competitive effects on average profits of firms.  Interestingly, the results run counter 
to a view which associates innovation with the generation of monopolistic power as our results 
for Dutch retailing indicate exactly the opposite.  In fact, entrepreneurial entrants seem to play a 
dual beneficial role in terms of being both pro competitive and innovative.   
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